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COMMENT
MIGRATING COUPLES AND WISCONSIN'S
MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
The Wisconsin Marital Property Act 1 has as its founda-
tion the belief that the contributions of both a husband and
wife to their marriage are equally valid and important 2 and
that marriage is a cooperative economic effoit.3 The Act rec-
ognizes and "rais[es] those contributions to the level of de-
fined, shared and enforceable property rights at the time the
contributions are made."4 The eight other community 5 prop-
erty states,6 however, have discovered that the path to equal-
ity is strewn with traps for unwary couples who change their
domiciles, leaving common-law property states to establish
new domiciles in community property states and vice versa.
Fortunately, the hindsight of the Act's authors, coupled with
the foresight and reasonableness with which the Act was writ-
ten, should prevent Wisconsin from suffering the pitfalls that
other states have experienced with in-migrating couples.
However, those who leave Wisconsin for a common-law state
will, in all probability, continue to find themselves mired in
legal uncertainty.
1. 1983 Wis. Laws 186. See also UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT, 9A U.L.A. 21 (Supp.
1985) [hereinafter cited as UMPA].
2. See UMPA, supra note 1, prefatory note.
3. See WISCONSIN COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, WISCONSIN WOMEN
AND THE LAW 5 (3d ed. 1979).
4. UMPA, supra note 1, prefatory note.
5. "Community property" is used synonymously with the term "marital property."
6. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Wash-
ington. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
7. For general discussions of migrating couples, see Abel, Barry, Halsted & Marsh,
Rights of a Surviving Spouse in Property Acquired by a Decedent While Domiciled
Outside California, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 211 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Abel]; Lay, Mari-
tal Property Rights of the Non-Native in a Community Property State, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
295 (1967); Sampson, Interstate Spouses, Interstate Property, and Divorce, 13 TEx. TECH
L. REv. 1285 (1982); Comment, In-Migration of Couples From Common Law Jurisdic-
tions: Protecting the Wife at the Dissolution of the Marriage, 9 N.M.L. Rnv. 113 (1979).
MIGRATING COUPLES
I. THE ACT IN GENERAL
Under Wisconsin's current common-law system of prop-
erty, a spouse who owns property by virtue of earning,
purchasing, or receiving it in any other manner, has exclusive
control over that interest.8 Thus, the salary of a husband who
works is his alone;9 it is not shared by the couple. The Wis-
consin Legislature, of course, has over the last century
promulgated a number of statutory protections for spouses in
8. Until only recently, that spouse was exclusively the husband. See Stimson v.
White, 20 Wis. 562 (1866) (earnings of the wife during the marriage are her husband's
property); Elliott v. Bently, 17 Wis. 610, 614 (1863) ("[T]he legal existence of the wife,
as a distinct person, is, for most purposes, merged in that of the husband, and the mar-
riage is an absolute gift to the husband of the goods, personal chattels and estate of
which the wife was actually and beneficially possessed at the time in her own right, and
of such other goods and personal chattels as may come to her during the marriage.")
(emphasis omitted). Compare Rasmussen v. Oshkosh Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 35 Wis. 2d
605, 611, 151 N.W.2d 730, 733 (1967) (although wife was custodian of her husband's
earnings, any surplus remaining was his sole property) with Koldrich v. Koldrich, 40
Wis. 2d 373, 379, 162 N.W.2d 132, 134 (1968) (property purchased partially with wife's
funds, the title of which was in her name, was not part of her separate estate). See also
Winslow, The Property Rights of Married Women, 1 MARQ. L. REv. 7, 11 (1916) (quot-
ing M. LUSH, A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM (1901)):
A century ago a married woman was, in legal text books, the associate of
idiots and lunatics; she was, generally speaking, as incapable of enjoying rights
over property, or creating rights by contract, as her own infant children. Upon
the marriage the husband and wife become one person in law; that one person
was the husband; the wife, for nearly all legal purposes, became on her marriage
a nonentity. She was the shadow, and her husband the substance; he took practi-
cally all the property to which she was entitled, and endowed her with just as
much or as little of his worldly goods as he pleased. She could not bring or
defend an action in her own name or in her own right, and an injury done to her
by the wrongful act of another person resulted, if an action were brought at all,
in a pecuniary profit to her husband, into whose pocket the damages found their
way. He could put her under lock and key if she didn't please him, and could, it
used to be said, administer moderate personal correction to her if she did not
behave properly. She could not, even after her husband's death, appoint a
guardian of her infant children.
Id.
Those common law principles not derogated by statute remain in full force. See
Wls. CONsT. art. XIV, § 13.
9. Despite changing values in the United States, the fact remains that while 77% of
the men in the labor force are employed in wage earning jobs only 52.7% of women in
the labor force are employed in wage earning positions. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 7 (Dec. 1983). Further, on average women earn
only about 60% of what men earn. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 469 (1984). Thus, it is more likely that the husband
will be the primary wage earner. The fact that hypotheticals in this Comment reflect
that reality should not be taken as an indication of chauvinism.
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general,10 and married women in particular."I Nevertheless, it
seems remarkable that despite Wisconsin's patchwork statu-
tory attempts to "protect" married women, there exists no ef-
fective legislation which grants them full parity with married
males in the context of immediate vested rights during the
marriage.' 2
The Act 13 changes all of this. It is based on the concept
that contributions of both spouses may be qualitatively differ-
ent and in flux but nevertheless of equal importance, and thus
"[establish] present shared property rights of spouses during
the marriage."' 14
Generally speaking, the Act recognizes three types of
property. Marital property is all-inclusively defined as "[a]ll
property of spouses. . . except that which is classified other-
wise by this chapter.' 1 5 Individual property is exclusively de-
fined and includes property owned by a spouse prior to
marriage; 16 property acquired by a spouse by gift, devise, or
descent; 17 property received in exchange for individual prop-
erty of a spouse;' 8 and appreciation of individual property.' 9
Simply put, property which is acquired by either spouse
within the framework of the marriage partnership is marital
property; that which is acquired outside the marriage is indi-
vidual property.20 All property is presumed to be marital
property.2'
10. See, eg., Wis. STAT. §§ 853.15, 852.01, 767.255- .261, and ch. 861 (1983-84).
11. See, eg., Wis. STAT. ch. 766 (1983-84).
12. The statutory protections noted supra note 10 do not grant any ownership
rights during the marriage; they merely prevent either spouse (usually the wife) from
facing unjust financial hardship. As such, the statutes do not amend the common law
for the better because they do not recognize the contributions of both spouses; they
merely "protect" them.
13. Most of the provisions in the Act will be found in chapter 766 of the Wisconsin
Statutes. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. ch. 766).
14. UMPA, supra note 1, prefatory note (emphasis in original).
15. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(1)).
16. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(6)).
17. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(a)).
18. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(b)).
19. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(c)).
20. The characterization of property can always be changed by agreement of the
parties through the use of pre- or post-nuptial agreements. See id. (to be codified at
Wis. STAT. § 766.17).
21. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(2)).
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A third classification of property which is neither labeled
nor defined but which is critically important to the workings
of the Act can best be described as property which is neither
marital nor individual.22 It includes property that was owned
exclusively by either spouse prior to the effective date of the
Act 23 and property brought to the state from a common-law
state, which retains the legal status affixed to it by the laws of
that state.2 4 It cannot be overemphasized that such property
is not "individual." Individual property is a creation of the
Act; property acquired in another state is not so defined by the
Act and, therefore, cannot be "individual."25 The confusion
in semantics resulting from interchanging one term for the
other has led to incorrect and harmful legal results.26 Wiscon-
sin courts are well advised to note and maintain the appropri-
ate property classification in future decisions.
Each spouse owns a present undivided fifty percent inter-
est in the marital property,2 7 although either spouse may sin-
gly "manage and control" it.28 Further, all property which is
neither marital nor individual but which would have been
marital property had it been acquired after the determination
22. See UMPA, supra note 1, § 4 comment. Perhaps the best label for this type of
property is "pre-determination date property." Id. See also infra note 29.
23. Such property is not reclassified by the Act. See 1983 Wis.Laws 186, § 47 (to
be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(8)). Any attempt to recharacterize the property
would presumably run afoul of the Constitution. See infra notes 70-82 and accompany-
ing text.
24. This results from a well settled conflict of laws principle:
A marital property interest in a chattel, or right embodied in a document, which
has been acquired by either or both of the spouses, is not affected by the mere
removal of the chattel or document to a second state, whether or not this re-
moval is accompanied by a change of domicil to the other state on the part of
one or both of the spouses.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259 (1969). See infra notes 37-49
and accompanying text. Property acquired in a common law state which would have
been marital property had it been acquired while the couple was domiciled in the com-
munity property state has been labeled "quasi-community" property by California and
Arizona. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West 1984); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318
(1976). See also infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
25. See UMPA, supra note 1, § 4 comment. Cf. Berle v. Berle, 97 Idaho 452, 546
P.2d 407 (1976); Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978).
26. See H. MARsH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 17-19, 224, 226
(1952); Sampson, supra note 7, at 1326-30.
27. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wls. STAT. § 766.31(3)).
28. Id. (to be codified at WIs. STAT. § 766.51).
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date2 9 is treated as though it were marital property in the
event of either the death 30 of a spouse or the dissolution 31 of
the marriage.32
Finally, it must be recognized that the Act is a property
ownership act; it is not a property distribution act.33 It "has
the function of confirming the ownership of property"34 during
the period of time that the marriage is legally viable. Thus,
upon such events as the death of a spouse or the dissolution of
the marriage, the current statutes 35 governing distribution 36
will be controlling. This is one of the critical elements which
will enable Wisconsin to avoid the legal headaches associated
with couples changing their domiciles from a common-law
property state to Wisconsin.
II. THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PARADOX IN A CHANGE
FROM A COMMON-LAW STATE TO A COMMUNITY
PROPERTY STATE
The problems associated with couples migrating from a
common-law property state to a community property state
arise primarily out of conffict of laws principles. One of those
principles is that a property interest in personalty which has
been acquired by either or both spouses is not affected by a
29."Determination date" means the last to occur of the following:
(a) Marriage.
(b) 12:01 a.m. on the date of establishment of a marital domicile in this state.
(c)12:01 a.m. on the effective date of this chapter (1986).
Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(5)).
30. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.77).
31. "Dissolution' means termination of a marriage by a decree of dissolution, di-
vorce, annulment or declaration of invalidity or entry of a decree of legal separation or
separate maintenance." Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(7)).
32. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.75).
33. UMPA, supra note 1, prefatory note.
34. Id.
35. The statutes have been amended to reflect the change to the community prop-
erty system. Compare, eg., Wis. STAT. § 861.35 (1983-84) (special allowance for sup-
port and education of children of a decedent within discretion of the court) with 1983
Wis. Laws 186, § 84 (to be codified as amended at Wis. STAT. § 861.35 (reworded to
include surviving spouse as a potential recipient of the special allowance)).
36. Because of the fundamental differences in the common-law and community
property designs, several statutes have been repealed and replaced by new allocation
schemes. See infra note 91.
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change of domicile to another state.37 Thus, property which is
acquired by a couple living in a common-law state and which
would, under the laws of that state, be the husband's "sepa-
rate" 38 property, remains the husband's property even after a
move to a community property jurisdiction.
This characterization of property can have dramatic re-
sults in cases dealing with taxation,40 quiet title suits, 41 and the
establishment of constructive trusts.42 However, the result is
probably most vivid in cases involving the death of a spouse 43
or divorce. This is due to a second conflict of laws principle:
the law applied to succession of property at death or the dis-
tribution of property upon divorce is the law of the domicile
of the couple when the event takes place. 4 The effect of these
two principles is that a couple may live in a common-law state
and acquire wealth which is classified as the husband's. If the
couple then moves to a marital property state, the property
remains his "separate" property. If he dies and leaves his
property to a third party, the wife may be faced with substan-
tial financial hardships because the statutory protections of
the common-law state are not available to her in the commu-
nity property state. In addition, the protection of the fifty per-
cent community property ownership is not available to her
37. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See, eg., Paley v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958); Reeves v.
Schulmeier, 303 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1962); Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302
(1877); Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978). Accord Nelson v.
American Employers' Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 252, 45 N.W.2d 681 (1951); But see. Edwards
v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, -, 233 P. 477, 486 (1924) ("At the time the property was
brought into Oklahoma, the law of this state attached thereto and governed the disposi-
tion of the same.").
38. Separate is used in the common-law sense and not in the context of marital
property. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
39. Some cases follow this rule but anchor their rationale in substantive due pro-
cess. See generally Sampson, supra note 7, at 1330.
40. See In re Drishaus' Estate, 199 Cal. 369, 249 P. 515 (1926); In re Frees' Estate,
187 Cal. 150, 201 P. 112 (1921);
41. See Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 P. 796 (1912); McDaniel v. Harley,
42 S.W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
42. See Brunner v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 26 Cal. App. 35, 145 P. 741 (1914);
Bosma v. Harder, 94 Or. 219, 185 P. 741 (1919).
43. The death of the husband has presented the majority of the problems. See
supra note 9.
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 180 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1950); In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933). See also RSTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 260, 263, 285 (1969).
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because the property was not acquired in a community prop-
erty state.
One of the earliest cases on record45 which demonstrates
this paradox is Kraemer v. Kraemer,46 a divorce case. The
couple had been married and domiciled in Illinois for over
twenty years, accumulating several thousand dollars in the in-
terim. The husband traveled to California and purchased land
with the money acquired in Illinois.47 Subsequently, his wife
and children joined him. Some years later, the wife sued for
divorce and division of the property. The trial court granted
her the divorce, but awarded all of the California land to the
husband on the theory that since the purchase of the land was
traceable to the husband's "separate" property, it likewise was
his separate property within the community property con-
text.48 The California Supreme Court affirmed the result and
adopted the trial court's rationale. 9
III. THE AVAILABLE SOLUTIONS
The problems presented by the Kraemer case 50 are not
without solutions. However, the attempts of the community
property states to find those solutions have been not unlike
people in a dark cluttered basement stumbling about in an at-
tempt to find the light switch. The image would be humorous
were it not for the hardship and pain which must be felt by the
spouse, usually the wife, who is left with little to show for
years of marriage.
A. The Common Sense Approach
Probably the most obvious and palatable solution 51 was
best presented by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Rau v.
45. But see Martin v. Boler, 13 La. Ann. 369 (1858); Tanner v. Robert, 5 Mart.
255 (La. 1826).
46. 52 Cal. 302 (1877).
47. Property which is traceable to separate property retains that classification. See
also 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 766.31(7)(b), .63).
48. See Kraemer, 52 Cal. at 302-03.
49. See id. at 306.
50. See also Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 P. 158 (1930); In re Nickson's
Estate, 187 Cal. 603, 203 P. 106 (1921); In re Burrows' Estate, 136 Cal. 113, 68 P. 488
(1902); Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 P. 796 (1912).
51. One writer has called it a "logical process." See Sampson, supra note 7, at
1332.
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Rau 2.5  The facts are classic in that money earned by the hus-
band in Illinois, classified as his separate property, was used to
buy a farm in Arizona after the couple moved to that commu-
nity property state.5 3 They subsequently filed for divorce. 4
Finding itself trapped by the conflict of laws between the two
states,"5 the trial court held that the farm was community
property and it was divided accordingly.
The appellate court rejected the reasoning of the lower
court and concluded that the property was clearly not com-
munity property. 6 Nevertheless, it upheld the equal division
of property by applying Illinois 57 rather than Arizona law.
Since the foreign law allowed for an equitable division of
property upon divorce, the fifty percent division by the trial
court was proper.5 8 The court dealt with the conflict of laws
questions by stating:
We do not believe our legislature intended to prevent our
divorce court from affecting the title to any and all property
which under the law of the state of acquisition might bear
the label "separate property." We construe the "separate
property" as to which the statutory prohibition applies to be
that defined in [the Arizona statute]. To apply this restric-
tion to "separate" estates acquired in a common-law juris-
diction only leads to unjust and unreasonable results ....
When the restriction is limited to the statutory definition,
the division made here does no violence to either the statutes
of Arizona, or Illinois, and carries out the basic law of both
jurisdictions that a fair division of marital property be made
upon divorce.5 9
52. 6 Ariz. App. 362, 432 P.2d 910 (1967).
53. Id. at -, 432 P.2d at 912.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
56. The farm, having been purchased with the husband's "separate" funds, was
clearly his separate property and not community property. See 6 Ariz. App. at _, 432
P.2d at 912.
57. The court took judicial notice of the laws of Illinois - a rarity. Generally, the
law of another state must be pleaded and proved. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 191
(1967); 14 A.L.R.3D 404.
58. See 6 Ariz. App. at _, 432 P.2d at 913.
59. Id. at -, 432 P.2d at 913-14 (citations and footnotes omitted). Arizona has
since adopted the quasi-community property approach. See Ch. 139 Ariz. Laws § 2
(1973), codified at § 25-318 (West Supp. 1983-84).
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This reasoning6° is sound and is followed by several other
jurisdictions.6 1 It places substance over blind obedience to
precedent by looking to the underlying philosophy of both
property systems, which is to protect both spouses. However,
the approach is not without its drawbacks. The complexity of
such a case inevitably leads to additional legal research and
excessive litigation, thus delaying resolution of the problem.
The burden, in both monetary and psychological terms, will
obviously be on the backs of the parties.62
B. Quasi-Community Property
The most legally efficient solution63 to the problem, and
that adopted by Wisconsin, is the "quasi-community" prop-
erty concept. Under this theory, pre-determination date prop-
erty acquired in the common-law state which would have been
community property had it been acquired in the community
property state maintains its "separate" characterization
throughout the duration of the marriage. Thus, the spouse in
60. This is virtually the same resolution to the problem as suggested by H. MARSH,
supra note 26.
[Tihose cases cannot be said to be authority against the contention made here
that the wife should be given the nonbarrable interest granted [the wife] by the
law of the former domicile ...
[T]here is not judicial authority which would prevent a court, outside of Cali-
fornia, from upholding such a claim if it were convinced that a correct approach
to the problem requires that result.
• . . [The wife merely] proves that the law of both states would give her one-
half on these facts and says: "I am claiming one-half of the property under one
or the other of these rules - I don't care which one. One of them must be
applicable since the case has no factual connection with any other jurisdiction."
Obviously, in order to deny this claim altogether, as the court which decided the
O'Conner case apparently would, it is necessary to characterize it as an issue of
"marital property" when the wife attempts to bring it under the community-
property statutes of the last domicile (thereby referring to the former domicile);
and then to turn around and characterize it as an issue of "succession" when she
attempts to bring it under the forced-heirship statutes of the former domicile
(thereby denying the applicability of that law, which in the previous breath was
said to be applicable). This procedure is, of course, merely characterization by
the lex causae, or double characterization of the issue - an exploded theory in
conflict of laws. Such a result is clearly both illogical and unjust, and a correct
analysis of the problem does not support it.
Id. at 232-33 (footnotes omitted).
61. See Berle v. Berle, 97 Idaho 452, 546 P.2d 407 (1976); Stephens v. Stephens, 93
N.M. 1, 595 P.2d 1196 (1979); Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978).
62. See Commentsupra note 7, at 119-20.
63. See Sampson, supra note 7, at 1331-32.
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possession of the property retains sole ownership and is free to
make inter vivos transfers even if no consideration is received
in exchange. Upon the termination of the marriage, however,
whether it be by death or dissolution, the property is treated,
for allocation purposes, as though it actually were community
property. 64
California was the pioneering state 5 in the use of the
quasi-community property concept, and the concept has suf-
fered many false starts and setbacks in its development.66 In
the wake of Kraemer v. Kraemer67 and other decisions,68 the
California Legislature, in 1917, attempted to ameliorate the
obvious glitch in the system by passing a provision which de-
fined community property to include "personal property
wherever situated, acquired while domiciled elsewhere, which
would not have been the separate property of either if ac-
quired while domiciled in this state. ' '69
The effect of the statute was to divest a spouse of separate
property rights merely by moving into the state of California.
Following several cases70 which clearly indicated the path the
California courts were going to follow, the statute was held to
be unconstitutional in In re Thornton's Estate.71 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that because the statute took property
which was vested in one spouse and gave it to the other, the
64. Fraudulent transfers, made for the purpose of withholding property from the
other spouse, are void. See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
65. See generally Lay, supra note 7, at 306-16; Sabban & Hoffman, California's
Community Property Laws: Planning for a Move to California, 121 TR. & EST. 10
(1982).
Today, California, Arizona, and Texas all utilize the concept of quasi-community
property in one form or another. Wisconsin thus becomes the fourth state to do so.
66. For an in-depth discussion of the California experience, see Lay, supra note 65,
at 297-317.
67. 52 Cal. 302 (1877). See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., In re Boselly's Estate, 178 Cal. 715, 175 P. 4 (1918); In re Niccolls'
Estate, 164 Cal. 368, 129 P. 278 (1912); In re Burrows, Estate, 136 Cal. 113, 68 P. 488
(1902).
69. 1917 Cal. Stat. 581, § 1.
70. See In re Arms' Estate, 186 Cal. 554, 199 P. 1053 (1921); In re Frees' Estate,
187 Cal. 150, 201 P. 112 (1921); In re Bruggemeyer's Estate, 115 Cal. App. 525, 2 P.2d
534 (1931).
71. 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
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enactment violated the due process and privileges and immu-
nities clauses of the United States Constitution. 72
During the twenty-five years following the Thornton deci-
sion, the California Legislature passed a number of provi-
sions73 which achieved results similar to those sought by the
1917 legislation but only in the case of the death of one
spouse. 74 Finally, in 1961, the legislature made another at-
tempt at protecting migrating couples. It passed a statute75
classifying as quasi-community property all personal property
and local real property acquired "while elsewhere which
would have been community property of the husband and
wife had the spouse [who] acquired the property been domi-
ciled in this State at the time of its acquisition. ' 76 Upon disso-
lution of a marriage, 77 both community and quasi-community
property is divided equally.78
This scheme passed constitutional muster in 1966 accord-
ing to the California Supreme Court in Addison v. Addison.79
The feature which distinguished the 1961 legislation from that
in Thornton was the fact that no vested rights were taken from
either spouse except upon the happening of a certain event:
dissolution of the marriage.80 Such an event triggers the "po-
lice power" which is inherent to all the sovereign states.81
Even vested rights are subject to interference by the state
72. If the right of a husband, a citizen of California, as to his separate property,
is a vested one and may not be impaired or taken by California law, then to
disturb in the same manner the same property right of a citizen of another state,
who chances to transfer his domicile to this state, bringing his property with
him, is clearly to abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizen. Again, to
take the property of A and transfer it to B because of his citizenship and domi-
cile, is also to take his property without due process of law.
Id. at -, 33 P.2d at 3.
73. See 1935 Cal. Stat. 831, § 1 (codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (1984); 1957
Cal. Stat. 490 (codified at Cal. Prob. Code § 201.7 (1984)).
74. See generally Abel, supra note 7.
75. 1961 Cal. Stat. 636 § 2 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 140.5, amended by Cal.
Civ. Code § 4803 (West 1984)).
76. Id.
77. If the grounds are for adultery, insanity, or extreme cruelty, the division of
property is to be an equitable one. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 146 (West 1984).
78. See id.
79. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
80. See id. at - 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
81. Id.
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"whenever reasonably necessary to the protection of the
health, safety, morals, and general well being of the people.")8 2
C. Wisconsin's "Deferral" Solution
1. In general
Under the Act, 83 Wisconsin becomes the fortunate benefi-
ciary of decades of trial and error experienced by the other
marital property states84 in dealing with migratory couples.
Wisconsin also benefits from the hindsight and (one can only
hope) the wisdom of the authors of the Act.
The protections afforded couples who have acquired
wealth in another state85 are grounded in two major aspects of
the Act. Wisconsin avoids the snarl of litigation resulting from
the use of another state's law by adopting the quasi-commu-
nity property approach, although the term itself is not men-
tioned.8 6 It is utilized in two situations: those in which a
spouse dies8 7 and upon dissolution of a marriage.8 8 Thus, in
either situation, the Act defines ownership rights of the
spouses at the time of the happening of the event; it does not
determine the actual allocation or distribution of that prop-
82. Id. See infra note 101 for similar Wisconsin holdings.
83. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. ch. 766).
84. See supra notes 37-82 and accompanying text.
85. This includes property purchased or otherwise exchanged for property from a
common-law state if it is traceable. See supra note 47.
86. The authors have chosen to term the concept the "deferred approach." See
UMPA, supra note 1 prefatory note; id. §§ 17-18 comments. The use of the term "de-
ferred" was apparently chosen to emphasize that the characterization of the property is
not altered when it is brought into the state, but rather, is postponed until the event
occurs, thereby avoiding constitutional problems. See supra notes 65-72 and accompa-
nying text.
87. Except as provided in sub. (2), at the death of a spouse domiciled in this
state all property then owned by the spouse which was acquired during marriage
and before the determination date and which would have been marital property
under this chapter if acquired after the determination date shall be treated as if it
were marital property.
1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.77(1)).
88. Except as provided in s. 766.73: (1) In a dissolution, all property then
owned by either or both spouses which was acquired during marriage and before
the determination date and which would have been marital property under this
chapter if acquired after the determination date shall be treated as if it were
marital property.
Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.75).
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erty.8 9 That task is left to existing Wisconsin statutory proce-
dures90 which, in turn, constitute the second touchstone of the
protections for migrating couples. 91
Consider a couple living in Illinois, a common-law state,
who, over a period of time, acquire $150,000 worth of prop-
erty. Assume that $50,000 of this was devised to the husband
individually by a relative and that the remaining $100,000 was
earned by the husband while the wife raised the couple's chil-
dren. Upon moving to Wisconsin, the character of the prop-
89. See UMPA, supra note 1, prefatory note. The Act
leaves to existing dissolution procedures in the several states the selection of the
appropriate procedures for dividing property. . . . [It] has the function of con-
firming the ownership of property as the couple enters the process. Thus reallo-
cation of property derived from the effort of both spouses during the marriage
starts from a basis of the equal undivided ownership that the spouses share in
their marital property. A given state's equitable distribution or other property
division procedures will depend on other applicable state law and judicial deter-
minations. An analogous situation obtains at death, with the Act operating pri-
marily as a property statute rather than a probate statute.
Id.
90. See supra note 35.
91. In the case of divorce, Wis. STAT. § 767.255 continues to be determinative of
the manner in which the property is divided. Ownership remains a factor in determin-
ing the manner of division and a new equitable factor has been added. See 1983 Wis.
Laws 186, § 50 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 767.255).
The Act is not designed to interfere with such a division under the statutes and
cases in an adopting state or to ordain an equal division when that is not other-
wise indicated. What the Act will do is to create a different balance of ownership
going in to the equitable division procedure from one which typically exists in
common law jurisdictions in which title and ownership are synonymous.
UMPA, supra note 1, § 17 comment (emphasis in original).
Similarly, Wis. STAT. § 767.26 controls the payment of alimony with the division of
property a factor in making the determination. See Wis. STAT. § 766.26(3)(1983-84).
The disposition of property upon the death of a testate spouse involves a new statu-
tory scheme. The dower-elective share provisions of Wis. STAT. §§ 861.03 - .15 have
been repealed since the deferred approach giving the spouse 50% of the property consti-
tutes its equivalent. The surviving spouse retains the right to disclaim an interest pass-
ing under a will.
In the case of a spouse who dies intestate, Wis. STAT. § 852.01(l)(a)(1-2) was
amended to provide the spouse with the entire estate if all surviving issue are also the
spouse's and one-half of the individual property estate if there are issue who are not the
surviving spouse's. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, §§ 59, 61 (to be codified at WIS. STAT.
§ 852.01(1)(a) 1-2).
There are, of course, other statutory protections; the exact functioning of the Pro-
bate Code is beyond the scope of this Comment. The point remains that the new chap-
ter 766 does not affect distribution of property except insofar as the determination of
ownership rights affects that distribution.
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erty would not change.92 That is, the husband would still have
vested ownership rights in all $150,000 worth of property.93
Further, the subsequent death of the husband would not cause
the ownership rights to suddenly split in two. Nevertheless,
for the purpose of distributing the property, the deferral con-
cept would be engaged. 94
If the husband died testate leaving everything to a third
person,95 the newly enacted section 766.7796 would merely de-
termine what is his to give. Under the statute, the money de-
vised to him is not property "which would have been marital
property. . . if acquired after the determination date" 97 and
thus, would be distributed through the husband's will. The
other $100,000, however, would have been marital property
and, as a result, would be treated as if fifty percent were the
husband's and fifty percent the wife's, thereby allowing the
wife to receive $50,000 with the balance passing under the
will. Of course, property acquired while the couple is domi-
ciled in Wisconsin is marital and creates a fifty percent vested
interest in the wife, which would obviously not be subject to
the will.
In the case of a divorce, the same reasoning would apply
but only so far as determining ownership rights. The final dis-
tribution may or may not end up reflecting those rights98 de-
pending on the equitable allocation of the court under existing
statutes.99
It seems clear that this scheme, which has been adopted in
other states, steers clear of constitutional violations. 100 It is
92. This assumes there are no marital property agreements that would vary the
effects of chapter 766. See 1983 'Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at WIs. STAT.
§ 766.17).
93. Remember, this would not be "individual property" as defined under the Act,
but rather property which is neither individual nor marital. See supra notes 22-26 and
accompanying text.
94. Assuming no marital property agreements.
95. See, eg., In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933).
96. See supra note 87.
97. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.77(1)).
98. See supra note 89.
99. See, eg., Mack v. Mack, 108 Wis. 2d 604, 323 N.W.2d 153 (1982); Wilber-
scheid v. Wilberscheid, 77 Wis. 2d 40, 252 N.W.2d 76 (1977); Antholt v. Antholt, 6
Wis. 2d 586, 95 N.W.2d 224 (1959).
100. See Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1965). Accord In re Marriage of Furimsky, 122 Ariz. 430, 595 P.2d 662 (1979).
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well settled in Wisconsin that the state's police power enables
the legislature to statutorily divest a property interest if the
divestiture serves the public interest. 10' Certainly the state's
interest in protecting the welfare of a spouse at death or disso-
lution is great enough to justify allocation of property under
the deferral approach. 0 2 It is, in fact, no different than the
approach taken for years under the elective share statute and
the statute allowing for distribution of property after a
divorce. 103
It should also be clear that because this scheme does not
transfer ownership prior to the happening of the event,'0 the
deferred property'0 5 of one spouse is not subject to the testa-
mentary disposition of the other if the second spouse prede-
ceases the spouse owning the property. 0 6  Thus, in the
example above, 10 7 if the wife predeceases her husband, she
could not devise any of the $150,000 - that would be an un-
constitutional divestment of his property. Because there
would be no ownership rights in the wife, she would be power-
less to devise it.
The next logical inquiry is whether a spouse can defeat the
statutory protection under the deferred approach by making
inter vivos transfers of property. This has been done in the
past by creating joint tenancies with third persons, 08 making
outright gifts, 109 and creating trusts. 110 At common law in
101. For an excellent discussion of the state's police power in general, see State ex
rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923). See also Noranda Explora-
tion, Inc. v. Ostrom, 107 Wis.2d 205, 320 N.W.2d 530 (1982); David Jeffrey Co. v.
Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954).
102. See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Weichers v. Weichers, 197 Wis.
159, 221 N.W. 733 (1928).
103. See, e.g., Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982); In re Mar-
riage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d'l, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
104. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 86.
106. Such a situation would, of course, allow an unconstitutional divestiture of
rights. See Paley v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500,
324 P.2d 35 (1958).
107. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g. Estate of Mayer, 26 Wis. 2d 671, 133 N.W.2d 322 (1965).
109. See, e.g., Mann v. Grinwald, 203 Wis. 27, 233 N.W. 582 (1930); Sederlund v.
Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750 (1922).
110. See, e.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954); In re
Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964). See generally Abel, supra note
7, at 220-23.
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Wisconsin it was recognized that if such transfers were made
with the intent to "frustrate the beneficent design of the [elec-
tive share] statute,"'11 the transfer could be set aside. 1 2 This
remedial concept was codified in section 861.17 13 in 1969.
Under the new law, the section has been amended to reflect
the change to a marital property system, 1 4 but it retains in-
tent 1 5 as the test for establishing a fraudulent conveyance. 16
Finally, the ownership of property which is acquired as
the direct consequence of property already in existence de-
pends upon whether it is acquired by virtue of appreciation' 7
or income. 18 Income which is earned during the marriage as
a consequence of marital property, individual property, or
property which is neither"19 is characterized as marital prop-
erty. 20  This is a consequence of the recognition that assets
which are gained during the marriage are the result of a con-
solidation of effort of the partnership. Therefore, if a spouse
owns a number of limousines in a common-law state which
111. Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 634, 187 N.W. 750, 752 (1922).
112. See Estate of Mayer, 26 Wis. 2d 671, 133 N.W.2d 322 (1965); Estate of Steck,
275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957); Mann v. Grinwald, 203 Wis. 27, 233 N.W. 582
(1930).
113. 1969 Wis. Laws 339, § 26.
114. If fraudulent intent is proved, the spouse is limited to a recovery of only that
share which she would have received had there been no conveyance. See 1983 Wis.
Laws 186, § 82 (to be codified as amended at Wis. STAT. § 861.17).
115. Some jurisdictions look to the amount of control that the conveying party
retains in determining if there has been a fraudulent conveyance. See Abel, supra note
7, at 220-23.
116. Protection for a spouse from such conveyance in a divorce action is covered by
Wis. STAT. § 767.275 (1983-84).
117. "'Appreciation' means a realized or unrealized increase in the value of prop-
erty." 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(2)).
118. "Income" means any of the following:
(a) Any wages, salary, commission, bonus, gratuity, payment in kind, de-
ferred employment benefit or proceeds other than death benefits of any health,
accident or disability insurance policy or of any plan, fund, program or other
arrangement providing benefits similar to those forms of insurance.
(b) An economic benefit having value attributable to the effort of a spouse.
(c) Dividends, interest or income trusts.
(d) Net rents and other net returns attributable to investment, rental, licens-
ing or other use of property, unless attributable to a return of capital or to
appreciation.
Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(10)).
119. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.01(10)). See supra notes 22-26 and
accompanying text.
120. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(4)).
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are rented to produce income, the limousines themselves re-
main "separate" property when the couple moves to Wiscon-
sin, while the income they produce is marital. 121
The new section 766.31(7)(c) establishes that appreciation
of a spouse's individual property is, likewise, individual. But
what of property acquired by one spouse in a common-law
state? Although it is not technically individual property,122
during the marriage it will be treated as though it is, making
the classification of appreciation individual as well. 2 3 There-
fore, upon dissolution of the marriage or death of a spouse,
any appreciation will accrue to the estate of the owning spouse
to be distributed under the appropriate statutes. 124 Of course,
if the appreciation is due to the efforts of one of the spouses
and is substantial, it is deemed marital property. 25
2. Classification of property left in a common-law state
When a couple moves from a common-law state to a com-
munity property state, leaving in the common-law state real or
121. See UMPA § 4 comment.
By treating all income from any source as marital property, the Act affords a
simple and understandable arrangement ....
The income rule poses some "front-end" and "tail-end" problems. The
"front-end" problem pertains to income received shortly after the determination
date from effort or accrual of rights before the determination date. Actual own-
ership of such income became fixed before the determination date and it should
not be and is not classified as marital property. This is handled by providing that
income is marital only if "earned or accrued" after the determination date and
during marriage.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (1911).
122. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
123. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(9)).
124. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. It has been noted that appreci-
ation of pre-determination date prbperty that has been reclassified due to the substantial
efforts of one spouse and subsequently mixed with martial property such that it is un-
traceable presents an interesting legal slight of hand. The mixing of the two would
cause the separate property to be reclassified as marital. This, however, would divest
ownership rights existing before the determination date, an unacceptable situation pre-
cluding the reclassification in the first place, and thus requiring a contravention of the
new section 766.63(1). See Furrh, Is the Marital Property Act Retroactive?, Wis. B.
BULL., July 1984, at 15, 17 & 96.
125. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2)). This
scheme mirrors the result in Plachta v. Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct.
App. 1984), in which the court determined that under Wisconsin's common-law system
of property, appreciation of a spouse's separate property retains its identity unless the
increase in value was due to joint enterprise.
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personal property acquired during the marriage, the property
left behind must be classified upon a subsequent divorce or
death of a spouse. For purposes of distribution, should the
property be classified under the common-law system as "sepa-
rate" or as deferral property (quasi-community property)
under the community property system?126 Unlike the Califor-
nia statutes,127 the Wisconsin Act is not clear on this issue.
Choice of law principles have traditionally held that if
property is realty, the choice of law for establishing title is
that of the situs; whereas, for so-called movables, the choice of
law has been either the domicile of the couple or the situs of
the property when acquired. 128 But rules regarding distribu-
tion of property in the event of divorce or death of a spouse
are distinguishable from title principles. What is really at is-
sue is not the right of ownership per se, but rather the inci-
dents of ownership in particular distribution rights, after the
couple has changed domicile and divorce or death has oc-
curred. 129 It is well settled that migration alone cannot alter
ownership rights without violating the Constitution.1 30 How-
ever, vested rights to property left behind in a common-law
state should be altered upon death or dissolution of marriage
to ensure a proper and just distribution of property.
If the property is classified under the law of the situs, one
spouse or the other will be open to all of the problems created
by the conflict of laws.13 1 However, bringing all property, do-
mestic or foreign, under the umbrella of the community prop-
erty framework avoids inequities and potential hardships. It
is therefore proper that out of state property acquired during
the marriage be classified as deferral property.
Assuming that a court has personal jurisdiction over the
husband and wife, a divorce decree creates obligations and
126. Obviously, property which even under community property principles is sepa-
rate or is traceable to separate property should be treated as such.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West 1985) reads in part: "Quasi-community prop-
erty means all real or personal property, wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter ac-
quired in any of the following ways. . . ." (emphasis added).
128. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 565 (1968); R. WEiNTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 445 (1980).
129. See LEFLAR, supra note 128, at 569-71.
130. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
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rights of the parties. 132 Clearly, the courts do not have power
to directly affect the title to property located in another
state,13 3 but it is equally clear that a court does have the power
to indirectly affect title to property in another state through
an order to convey the property effective upon a person over
which it has personal jurisdiction. 134  When a Wisconsin
couple acquires property during marriage and leaves it in a
common-law state, that property should be classified as defer-
ral property 135 for purposes of distribution.
IV. MIGRATION FROM A COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATE
TO A COMMON-LAW STATE
A. The Problem
Consider an example of a couple who take their property
with them in a migration from a community property state to
a common-law state. 136 In the event of the subsequent death
of the wage-earner spouse following the couple's domicile in
the common-law state, the surviving spouse's interest in the
couple's estate should not be diminished as a result of the
move. In fact, assuming the decedent has been the wage
earner, the surviving spouse should always be in a better posi-
tion than if the couple had acquired all their assets in the com-
mon-law state. 137 This financial gain assumes that a common-
law state will properly apply traditional conflict of law prin-
132. See Phelps v. Williams, 192 A.2d 805 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963); McElreath v.
McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).
133. See, eg., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89,
-, 546 P.2d 358, 361 (1976); Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, -, 95 N.W.2d 682,
688-89 (1959); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 16 Wis. 2d 176, 187, 114 N.W.2d 129, 136
(1962).
134. See cases cited supra note 133. See also Argent v. Argent 396 F.2d 695, 698
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968). This is a consequence of the police power of the state. See supra
notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
135. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 128, at 191-92, 428-30, 574-75; R. WEINTRAUB,
supra note 128, at 429.
136. For an analysis of the law applicable to property left behind after the couple
moves, see Succession of Popp, 146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1920); Succession of Parkwood,
9 Rob. 438 (La. 1845); In re Estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967); In re Warburg's Estate, 38 Misc. 2d 997, 237 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). See also I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY 353 (1973); Lay, Property Rights
Following Migration From a Community Property State, 19 ALA. L. REv. 298, 301
(1967); infra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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ciples. 138 A proper application1 3 9 would present the following
situation:
H and W move from community property state X to com-
mon-law state Y. While domiciled in state X, H, the wage
earner, and W acquire community assets of $300,000, of
which H is entitled to $150,000 (his community property).
H and W take the $300,000 with them to state Y, where H
continues to earn income which is thereafter classified as H's
separate property ($100,000). When H dies, W is entitled to
her $150,000 of community property plus one-third of the
combined total of H's community property and separate
property (W's elective forced share). W's total inheritance:
$233,333.140
This situation is ideal considering the wife in a common-law
state would have received only $133,333141 and the wife in a
community property state would have received only
$200,000.142
Although the above situation is ideal, it is non-existent.
The problems faced by couples migrating from a community
property jurisdiction to a common-law jurisdiction are often
handled incorrectly, 143 unjustly144 or not at all. 145 The follow-
138. For the purpose of determining marital property rights, the character of the
assets is determined according to the state of marital domicile at the time the property
was acquired, and that character is not altered when the couple moves to another state.
See H. MARSH, supra note 26, at 225-33; Lay, supra note 7, at 330-331.
139. However, it must be remembered that "no reported case has ever held that a
couple can own community property in a common law state." Clausnitzer, Property
Rights of Surviving Spouses and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. FAM. L. 471, 492 (1979-80).
140. This analysis divides in half the property acquired in the community property
state. The property acquired after the change in domicile is then divided according to
the common-law forced share provision.
141. Assuming the entire monetary estate was built up through H's efforts, one-
third of W's total estate of $400,000.
142. One-half of the community estate of $400,000.
143. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kessler 177 Ohio St. 136, 203 N.E.2d 221 (1964)
(although court recognized the wife's community property as vested, it went on to dis-
tinguish it from full ownership because the husband had full right of management and
control). See also Lay, supra note 136, at 326; Lay, Migrants from Community Property
States - Filling the Legislative Gap, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv. 832, 836 (1967-68).
144. See, e.g., In re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951); Common-
wealth v. Tejen, 197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 801 (1956). In both cases the court refused to
recognize the wife's community property interest as vested, considering instead that the
total estate was owned by the husband as the sole title holder. See also Clausnitzer,
supra note 139, at 493.
145. "The scarcity of precedent suggests uncertainty about the law." Clausnitzer,
supra note 139, at 492.
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ing portion of this Comment will focus on the problems faced
by a lawyer in a common-law state who attempts to under-
stand the law of community property. 146
Case law concerning the migration of couples from com-
munity property jurisdictions to common-law jurisdictions is
scarce. This "dearth of judicial decisions in the area does not
mean that it is inconsequential or that few problems ever
arise."' 147 It is more likely that cases are settled out of court 148
or that the problems created by such a move simply go unrec-
ognized. Recognition is crucial, however, because the client
suffers if the attorney remains ignorant of the community
property concept. 149 At present, community property statutes
exist in Arizona, 150 California,"' Idaho,'52 Louisiana, 153 Ne-
vada,1 4 New Mexico, 55 Texas, 156 Washington 5 7 and, as of
January 1, 1986, Wisconsin.158 During the 1940s the states of
Michigan, 5 9  Nebraska, 160 Oklahoma, 16 1 Oregon,162  Penn-
sylvania 163 and the territory of Hawaii' 64 adopted community
property statutes to take advantage of federal tax laws. While
these statutes were subsequently repealed 165 or declared un-
146. For an expanded discussion of this problem, see Polasky, Mullin & Pigman,
Estate Planning for Migrating Clients: Problems When Couple Moves from Community
Property State to Common Law State, 101 TR. & EsT. 876 (1962).
147. Lay, supra note 143, at 839.
148. This is especially true in the tax area because the cost of the litigation almost
always outweighs the amount of the tax. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Terjen, 197 Va.
596, 90 S.E.2d 801 (1956).
149. Lay, supra note 143, at 839.
150. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1976).
151. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 21; CAL. CIv. CODE § 162-64 (West 1984).
152. IDAHO CODE §§ 32.903-.906(A) (Supp. 1984).
153. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (Supp. 1984).
154. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123.130, .180, .190, .220 (1979).
155. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-2 (Supp. 1975).
156. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975).
157. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010 - .030 (Supp. 1976).
158. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186.
159. Act 317, § 26.216(2) - 26.216(20), 1947 Mich. Pub. Acts 517.
160. Ch. 156, §§ 1-17, 1947 Neb. Laws 427.
161. Tit. 32, §§ 1-18, 1947 Okla. Sess. Laws 118.
162. Ch. 525, §§ 1-17, 1947 Or. Laws 910.
163. Act 550, §§ 1-16, 1947 Pa. Laws 1423.
164. Ch. 301A, §§ 1-18, 1945 Hawaii Sess. Laws 312.
165. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 510-1 to 510-11 (Supp. 1983); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 26.216(21) - (25) (Callaghan 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-604 to -616 (1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 51-82 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.510- .550
(1975).
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constitutional 166 due to the enactment of tax legislation in
1948,167 the impact of community property law remains.
B. Practical Considerations of a Change in Domicile.
After a couple makes the decision 168 to move from a com-
munity property state to a common-law state, an important
problem, and one which is least often considered, relates to
the legal implications of the move. 169 The primary problem
encountered 170 at this point is the determination of which
state's law governs the couple's fights and taxable interests as
to property acquired after marriage. 171 An accurate or inac-
curate determination of whether the property is separate or
community will have a profound effect on the rights of all par-
ties when marital dissolution, death, tax liability or estate
planning is concerned. 172 The questions presented in this area
are particularly relevant for those Wisconsin residents consid-
ering a future move. It is important to consider the way that
courts have handled, or have refused to handle, the migration
situation. The various circumstances in which this migration
problem is likely to arise are outlined below.
1. Domicile changed; property remained
When a couple moves from a community property juris-
diction to a common-law jurisdiction and leaves property be-
hind, the traditional conflict rules173 implemented by the
166. See, e.g., Willcox v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521
(1947).
167. See I.R.C. § 6013 (1981) (concerning joint returns of income tax by husband
and wife).
168. It has been noted that the decision to move is often made for a couple. See
Lay, supra note 136, at 298.
169. See id. at 298-99. The author points out that while "this determination...
may be an exceedingly difficult task for one who has little knowledge of the community
method of property ownership, it is imperative because the impact of the interstate
move can be weighed and evaluated intelligently only after such determination." Id. at
299 (footnote omitted).
170. See Note, Community Property in a Common Law Jurisdiction: A Seriously
Neglected Area of the Law, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 77, 82 (1976-77).
171. See W. DEFUNIAK & M. NAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 89 (2d ed. 1971).
172. See I. BAXTER, supra note 136, at 340.
173. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 223, 244
(1969) (regarding the conveyance of real and personal property).
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courts may not be an accurate reflection of the relative rights
of either party. The most widely recognized rule whenever
there is any change in domicile is that "a change of domicile
by a husband and wife from a community property state to a
separate property state or vice versa, has no effect on the clas-
sification (as community or separate) of property acquired
prior to the removal (or property into which such property
can be traced)." 17 4 The major problem, as demonstrated by
the following cases, is that common-law courts have had great
difficulty accurately applying this simple rule.
Three leading cases in this area reflect the current judicial
trend. Wallack v. Wallack15 is a 1955 divorce action in which
the Georgia Supreme Court considered the disposition of
property acquired during the couple's marriage. The parties
were originally domiciled in Texas, a community property ju-
risdiction. There, they acquired personal property and a large
bank account. While still living in Texas, the parties obtained
a divorce, thereafter changing their domicile to Georgia, a
common-law jurisdiction. Because the property settlement
had not been litigated in Texas, the wife brought an action in
Georgia to determine her property rights in the personal prop-
erty acquired in Texas.1 7 6 In the suit, she claimed a one-half
community share of the Texas property. Texas courts, and
other community property state courts, 17 7 hold that "where
the rights of the spouses to community property are not deter-
mined in the divorce action, the former spouses hold the prop-
erty as tenants in common." 178 This established legal theory
allowed the court to dispose of the issue on grounds with
which it was more familiar: the law of tenancy in common. 7 9
174. I. BAXTER, supra note 136, at 341.
175. 211 Ga. 745, 88 S.E.2d 154 (1955).
176. Id. at 748, 88 S.E.2d at 156.
177. See H. MARSH, supra note 26, at 247: "By the law of all the American com-
munity states at the present time, an absolute divorce, with no division of property in
the decree, makes the spouses tenants in common of the former community property,
and the wife can recover one-half thereof from the husband. Hence, she should also be
permitted to do so in the common-law state."
178. Note, supra note 170, at 85.
179. Obviously, tenancy in common is a familiar concept in common-law jurisdic-
tions. Therefore, the court embraced this more familiar theory in order to sidestep the
crucial legal issue, that is: what are the property interests of common-law domiciliaries
in community property? This type of legal sidestepping has been criticized. See, e.g.,
Polasky, Mullin & Pigman, supra note 146, at 880.
[Vol. 68:488
MIGRATING COUPLES
This left unanswered the question of the appreciation of com-
munity property when the community property interest re-
mains unchanged.
In more carefully reasoned decisions, two New York
courts considered the respective property rights of a surviving
spouse. In the first, In re Warburg's Estate,180 the court con-
sidered the effect of a change in domicile from Germany to
New York. The Warburgs were originally domiciled in
Hamburg, Germany, a city governed by community property
laws. The rise of Nazism resulted in the confiscation of their
assets."8  Fearing death, the couple fled to New York where
they obtained citizenship and became domiciliaries. The hus-
band subsequently died, and the German government made
restitution to the wife for the value of the property it previ-
ously confiscated. In a well reasoned opinion the court, ap-
parently applying traditional conflict rule,8 2 separated the
two primary issues. First, the court looked to German law to
determine the relative rights and interests of each party in the
personalty acquired in Germany. Second, given those rights,
the court looked to the law of New York to determine the
proper disposition to be made at death.183 Several commenta-
tors have found this approach "to be very satisfactory and
workable."'' 8 4 Because the couple was domiciled in New York
at the time of the husband's death, the law of New York was
the proper basis for disposition considerations. Moreover, the
simple fact that they were forced to move should not affect
their rights in the property acquired during their domicile in
Germany. 18 5
The second New York case, In re Estate of Crichton,8 6 is
said to have effectively revolutionized American marital prop-
erty conflict law.18 7 In this 1967 case, the decedent, a native
of Louisiana, had accumulated a substantial estate consisting
180. 38 Misc. 2d 997, 237 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
181. Id.
182. See Note, supra note 170, at 83.
183. See 38 Misc. 2d at 999, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59.
184. Lay, supra note 136, at 321. See also Note, supra note 170, at 83.
185. See Lay, supra note 136, at 321.
186. 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
187. See Juenger, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Tale of Two Coun-
tries, 81 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1061, 1076 (1981). But see Bartke & Zurvalec, The Low,
Middle and High Road to Marital Property Law Reform in Common Law Jurisdictions,
1985)
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of bank accounts, stocks, and bonds. After a period of time,
the decedent moved from Louisiana to New York, leaving a
large portion of his acquired assets in Louisiana. After being
domiciled in New York for several years thereafter, the dece-
dent died, survived by his second wife (from whom he had
been separated for twenty-seven years) and by four children
from his first and second marriages. Upon disposition of the
husband's estate, the wife appeared in court claiming commu-
nity rights in one-half of the decedent's estate.
While the court acknowledged the traditional conflict of
law rule'88 and recognized that the proper application of that
rule would allow Louisiana law to govern the disposition of
the assets which were acquired there, the court rejected this
rule. The court took a jurisdictional approach instead and
looked at the contacts between the decedent and the state of
Louisiana. 189 Finding that decedent's contacts with Louisiana
were minimal and insignificant1 90 the court determined that
the case should be disposed of under New York law. 191 Ap-
plying New York law, 9' the court determined that the surviv-
ing spouse was entitled to only one-third of the estate. The
court disavowed the traditional conflict rules because it felt
they failed to consider the policies of other jurisdictions and
the interests that those other jurisdictions have in the applica-
tion of their own laws. 19 3 While this may be true and one may
wish to apply it to the particular facts of this case, thereby
feeling comfortable in denying the wife's community interest,
the reality is that the court failed to accurately apply estab-
lished law. As a result of this failure, the wife's interests were
diminished.
7 COMM. PROP. J. 200, 219 (1980) (contending that Wisconsin's consideration of the
Uniform Marital Property Act is truly the revolution of our time).
188. See 20 N.Y.2d at 133, 228 N.E.2d at 805, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 135, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820-21.
191. "New York, as the domicile of Martha and Powell Crichton, has not only the
dominant interest in the application of its law and policy, but the only interest." Id. at
134, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
192. N.Y. REv. CODE § 63.281 (1976).
193. 20 N.Y.2d at 133, 228 N.E.2d at 805, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
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2. Domicile changed; property transferred
As a general rule, when a couple changes their domicile
from a community property state to a common-law state and
take their personal property with them, their relative interests
in the property acquired during marriage are governed by the
laws of the state of acquisition. 194 The simplicity of this rule is
apparent, yet common-law courts have found it difficult to ap-
ply in a strict sense. There has been a general hesitation on
the part of common-law courts to classify community prop-
erty as community property. 195 Although the courts tend to
follow the applicable conflict rules, 196 "the means of reaching
the desired conclusion often varies from state to state."'197
Courts have imposed constructive or resulting trusts or have
treated property as commonly owned, but have done so under
the traditional and more familiar common-law theory. The
exact nature of this legal sidestepping is demonstrated in the
following divorce and tax cases.
In the early case of Depas v. Mayo198 a husband and wife
accumulated a large estate while domiciled in Louisiana. Af-
ter several years of marriage they moved to Missouri, where
the husband invested in real property, taking title in his name
alone. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mayo (Depas) divorced her
husband. In an attempt to defraud his wife, Depas put the
remainder of his personal property beyond the reach of legal
process. Mrs. Mayo, claiming that she was entitled to her
community share of her husband's real and personal property,
brought legal action to determine her interests. Although the
Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged that while the couple
was domiciled in Louisiana the wife had a community inter-
194. See Doss v. Cambell, 19 Ala. 590 (1851); Rau v. Rau, 6 Ariz. App. 362, 432
P.2d 910 (1967). See also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.18 (AJ. Casner ed.
1952).
195. "[N]o reported case has ever held that a couple can own community property
in a common law state. This precise question has always been sidestepped. The reason
for it is, of course, that the notion of community property does not exist in the common
law state." Clausnitzer, supra note 139, at 492. See also Johanson, The Migrating Cli-
ent: Estate Planning for the Couple from a Community Property State, 9 INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 8.1, § 811 (1975).
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 258-60, 263-64
(1969) for the relevant conflicts rules.
197. Note, supra note 170, at 86.
198. 11 Mo. 314 (1848).
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est, 199 it held that Missouri's common law governed because
the property was no longer located in Louisiana. In holding
as it did, the court changed the character of the interest of
each party. Although the court imposed a constructive trust
on behalf of Mrs. Mayo, recognizing the vested nature of her
interests, 2°° the fact is that the move across state lines
recharacterized her interest.
The following two examples demonstrate the use of the
constructive interest theory in a succession case. In the 1924
decision Edwards v. Edwards,2 °' the plaintiff and the decedent,
original domiciliaries of Oklahoma, moved to Texas in an at-
tempt to cash in on the oil business. After living in Texas for
a little over a year, the couple acquired assets in excess of
$80,000.202 After their stay in Texas, the couple moved back
to Oklahoma, where Mr. Edwards was killed.20 3 Before Mr.
Edwards' death, he invested most of the assets he had ac-
quired in land and bank accounts, taking title in his mother's
name. In an attempt to determine the wife's rights in the
property, the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked at the law of
Texas and determined that she held a vested interest in the
property of her husband.204 Having made this determination,
the court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the wife. °5
This same result was reached in Quintana v. Ordono,z°6 a
1967 decision. In Quintano, the children of the decedent
brought an action to determine the rights of their stepmother
in their father's estate. While the couple lived in Cuba, the
199. Id. at 319.
200. "Since trust doctrine is equitable perhaps the court approached the problem
with an idea of doing 'justice' between the parties rather than with the idea of applying a
particular legal concept. . . . An important aspect. . . is that the court treated the
wife's interest in the community property as a vested one." Lay, supra note 136, at 334.
201. 108 Okla. 93, 233 P. 477 (1924).
202. Apparently, the couple did "cash in" on a good deal somewhere, but not in
the oil business. The court makes particular note of "the questionable character of the
businesses they conducted." Id. at -, 233 P. at 479.
203. The wife was charged and acquitted of the murder. See H. MARSH, supra note
26, at 242.
204. 108 Okla. at -, 233 P. at 485. See also H. MARSH, supra note 26, at 242-43
(suggesting that the court engaged in pure dictum when it agreed with the trial court
that one-half of the property belonged to the wife, the other one-half to her husband,
and that neither could dispose of the other's interest).
205. 108 Okla. at -, 233 P. at 485.
206. 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
[Vol. 68:488
MIGRATING COUPLES
decedent-husband invested in $100,000 of stock in a Florida
corporation. The stock was acquired with community
funds.20 7 Eventually, the couple moved to Florida, and upon
selling the stock, the husband received a promissory note in
the amount of $8 10,000.208 His surviving spouse claimed one-
half the value of the note as her community interest. The
court held that under the law of Cuba the stock did not vest
solely in the husband, but instead, the wife held a vested inter-
est in it equal to that of her husband. 20 9 In addition, "[t]he
interest which vested in the wife was not affected by the subse-
quent change of domicile from Cuba to Florida ... -21
Even though these common-law jurisdictions have at-
tempted to protect the interests of all parties, this protection
has not evolved from a well-reasoned recognition of the legal
interests of each party. It has been observed that:
[e]ven where the interests of the parties have been protected
in a common law state, protection has not always been ac-
complished through a recognition of the rights of a spouse in
the property as community property. . . . [T]he courts
have. . . resorted to an equitable trust doctrine to effectuate
this protection. Such legalistic reasoning would be totally
unnecessary if the interests were entirely unaffected by the
move since the court could simply reason that it was com-
munity before the move, ergo, community after the move.211
This conflict creates significant constitutional problems,21 2 as
well as general confusion within the field of marital property
law. This confusion is increased when common-law courts
207. "Section 1407 of the Civil Code of Cuba, the place of the domicile at the time
of the acquisition of the stock, provides that all property of the marriage shall be consid-
ered as community property. ... Id. at 580.
208. Id. at 578-79.
209. Id. at 580.
210. Id. The court also noted that since the promissory note was acquired while
the couple lived in Florida that transaction was controlled by Florida law. Id. The
court concluded by succinctly denominating the theories underlying its reasoning:
Under Florida law, if a portion of the consideration belongs to the wife and
title is taken in the husband's name alone, a resulting trust arises in her favor by
implication of law to the extent that consideration furnished by her is used. A
resulting trust is generally found to exist in transactions affecting community
property in noncommunity property states where a husband buys property in his
own name. Therefore, while the husband held legal title to the note and con-
tract, he held a one-half interest in trust for his wife. Id. (footnotes omitted).
211. Lay, supra note 136, at 300.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 219-21.
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have attempted to assess gift or estate taxes on property which
was acquired in a common-law jurisdiction.
Three cases in particular demonstrate both the failures and
success of the common-law states in attempting to define the
rights of all interested parties. In Commonwealth v. Terjen,213
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals vested in the husband
sole interest in property which the husband and wife had ac-
quired in California.2"4 While the couple was domiciled in
California they had accumulated a substantial amount of
property which they brought with them when they moved to
Virginia. During their domicile in Virginia, the husband
bought a house with community funds and took title in his
wife's name. Although the husband filed a tax return and
paid the gift tax for his one-half of the purchase price of the
home, the Virginia Department of Taxation contended that
the entire cost of the home was a gift to the wife. l5 The court
agreed and assessed the full value of the home as a gift to the
wife, effectively denying that the wife had half ownership in
the purchase monies by virtue of her prior community
interest.
In re Kessler's Estate216 is a similar case involving the
transportation of property from a community property juris-
diction to a common-law jurisdiction. In Kessler, while the
couple lived in California, the husband acquired shares of
stock in his own name. Later, they moved to Ohio where the
husband died. The tax commissioner argued that upon the
husband's death, the wife inherited the full value of the stock,
and therefore, she was liable for a succession tax as to that full
amount. The wife argued that she owned half the stock prior
to her husband's death and that therefore, she was only liable
for a tax as to half the full value - that being her husband's
share. This case varied from Terjen in that the Ohio Supreme
213. 197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 801 (i956).
214. Id. at -, 90 S.E.2d at 804. The husband had contended that because the
property "was held as community property in California where his wife had a present
vested interest in one-half,. . . [the] one-half interest was not divested by the transfer of
the property and domicile from California to Virginia." Id. at -, 90 S.E.2d at 802.
215. Id at -, 90 S.E.2d at 802. It should be noted that the additional tax was only
$140.00, a factor which discourages potential original suits or appeals in these tax
cases. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
216. 177 Ohio St. 136, 203 N.E.2d 221 (1964).
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Court "labeled" the wife's interest as a vested one,2 17 but the
court proceeded to redefine the concept of the wife's vested
interest according to what it considered to be the nature of the
wife's interest. The court concluded that the wife's one-half
interest was not in the nature of outright ownership until her
husband's death.218 In effect, the court employed a type of ten-
ancy-in-common approach. The court finally held that the
wife was only responsible for the tax applicable to her hus-
band's one-half portion of the estate.
Kessler's Estate and Terjen serve to demonstrate a consti-
tutional problem at issue in the majority of the migration
cases: how can a court reclassify an interest following migra-
tion without violating the fourteenth amendment?219 Any at-
tempt to recharacterize property interests merely because
there has been an interstate change in domicile is potentially
violative of due process. 220  "Therefore, any attempt to
recharacterize ownership as a tenancy by the entirety, joint
tenancy, or tenancy-in-common ... merely because of a
move to a common law state, could very well encounter con-
stitutional difficulties . . .[resulting from] the loss of vested
property interests. '221
One common-law case succeeded in correctly defining the
wife's community property interest. The question in People v.
Bejarano2 22 involved the assessment of an inheritance tax on
one-half of the proceeds from a retirement fund to which Mr.
Bejarano had contributed during the couple's domicile in Cal-
ifornia. The wife argued that she held a vested one-half inter-
est in the retirement fund prior to her husband's death, and
that this one-half interest was not subject to inheritance tax
upon her husband's death. The tax commissioner argued ac-
cording to the precedent set in Terjen and Kessler's Estate,
claiming that full ownership rights did not arise in the wife
217. Id. at 139, 203 N.E.2d at 223.
218. Id. at 144, 203 N.E.2d at 226.
219. For an example of the difficulties one state has encountered in the reverse
situation, see In re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934). See generally Lay,
supra note 7.
220. Lay, supra note 7, at 295.
221. Id.
222. 145 Colo. 304, 358 P.2d 866 (1961).
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until Mr. Bejarano's death,2 23 and therefore such ownership
was a taxable event. In a 1961 decision, the Colorado
Supreme Court disagreed. Recognizing and applying the
traditional conflict rule224 to the laws of California, the court
held that the wife's one-half interest had been previously
vested and was not subject to tax. Bejarano has been noted as
"one of only a handful of state tax cases in which the question
of community ownership has been litigated . . .[and] is the
only tax case in which the question has been handled
intelligently. 225
V. CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, the state of the law with regard
to the migration issue is far from settled. Although the com-
mon-law states have begun to effectively deal with the prob-
lem,22 6 some of the central issues have not yet been considered
by the courts.227 Accurate determination of the rights and in-
terests of migrating couples is a timely issue, and the courts
are losing ground. The issue speaks at every stage of a mar-
riage and should not only be considered upon its dissolution.
PATRICE E. PATTERSON
MICHAEL HALE AHRENS
223. Id. at 307, 358 P.2d at 868.
224. See supra note 138 fo" the rule.
225. Johanson, supra note 195, §§ 800-04 (emphasis in original).
226. See, e.g., 8 U.L.A. 61. The Uniform Disposition of Community Property
Rights at Death Act was enacted by the legislatures of Colorado (COLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 15-20-101 to -111 (1973)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 510-21 to -30 (Supp.
1983)); Kentucky (KY. REv. STAT. §§ 391.210 to .260 (Supp. 1976)); Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.261 to .271 (West Supp. 1984-85)); and Oregon (OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 112.705 to .775 (1983)). The statute applies to the disposition of all personal
property which was community property in another state and all assets acquired with
such property. The attempt was made to relieve some of the conflicts of law problems
through statutory classification of interests. See Clausnitzer, supra note 139, at 496-97.
227. See generally, Polasky, Mullin & Pigman, supra note 146.
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